DGPPN-Akademie Workshop

Quellen

Philosophie, Ethik und Didaktik

in der Psychiatrie

Leitthema

Psychiatrie zwischen

Naturalisierung und Subjektivität

DGPPN-Akademie Workshop

Psychiatrie zwischen Naturalisierung und Subjektivität

I. Einleitung

II. Geschichte und Gegenwart der Nervenheilkunde

III. Das Psychophysische Problem im 19. / 20. Jh.

IV. Psychiatrie – eine ‚Brückendisziplin der Modalitäten‘

I. Einleitung

‚Mindlessness and brainlessness in psychiatry' ***(L Eisenberg)***

‚Toward a philosophical structure for psychiatry' ***(KS Kendler)***

‚Advances in biological psychiatry into therapeutics'
(TheMaudsley)

‚Cultural and Biological Contexts of Psychiatric Disorder'
(FPR-UCLA Conference 2010)

„Neither mindlessness nor brainlessness can be tolerated in psychiatry or medicine. The unique role of psychiatry in medicine will be found in the extent to which it contributes to the understanding of psychosomatic and somatopsychic integration; i.e., to the ways in which the mind is embodied and the body literally mindfull“.

Eisenberg L (1986) Mindlessness and brainlessness in psychiatry.
British Journal of Psychiatry, 148:505.

„Psychiatry needs to move from a prescientific „battle of paradigms“ toward a more mature approach that embraces complexity along with empirically rigorous and pluralistic explanatory models.”

„Psychiatric disorders are, by their nature, complex multilevel phenomena. We need to keep our heads clear about their stunning complexity and realize, with humility, that their full understanding will require the rigorous integration of multiple disciplines and perspectives.“

Kendler KS (2005) Toward a philosophical structure for psychiatry. American J Psychiatry 162:3, 433, 439.

- ***Psychiatry is irrevocably grounded in mental, first-person experiences.***
- ***Cartesian substance dualism is false. Epiphenomenalism is false.***
- ***Both brain > mind and mind > brain causality are real.***
- ***Psychiatric disorders are etiologically complex, and we can expect no more „spirochete-like“ discoveries that will explain their origins in simple terms.***
- ***Explanatory pluralism is preferable to monistic explanatory approaches, especially biological reductionism.***
- ***Psychiatry needs to move from a prescientific „battle of paradigms“ toward a more mature approach that embraces complexity along with empirically rigorous and pluralistic explanatory models.***
- ***Finally, we need to accept „patchy reductionism“ with the goal of piecemeal integration in trying to explain the complex etiological pathways to psychiatric illness a little bit a time.***

Kendler KS (2005) Toward a philosophical structure for psychiatry. American J Psychiatry 162:3, 433-440.

„The last two decades have seen tremendous advances in biological psychiatry – the sequencing of the genome, the development of molecular biology, the development of to see and measure brain processes like never before.

These advances have changed our view of these illnesses. As a result it is widely accepted now that most psychiatric illnesses have strong and identifiable biological basis. The challenge now is to translate these biological advances into meaningful therapeutic advances.

The conference will highlight some of these advances and will try and address how and when these advances might translate into clinical care.“

Translating Advances in Biological Psychiatry into Therapeutics: moving from bench to bedside. A conference honouring the memory of Professors Robert W Kerwin & Lyn S Pilowsky. 24th-25th November 2008 - Institute of Psychiatry, London, UK.

„Synopsis: Our concept of mental illness in the West is largely shaped by the DSM diagnostic model … . However, both neuroscientists and anthropologists have raised questions about the validity and utility of these (DSM) categories.

Neuroscientists are concerned that the categories obfuscate the key brain-behavior linkages underlying pathological processes. Anthropologists on the other hand argue that the categories are largely social constructions and that the current neurobiological zeitgeist minimally attends to social and cultural processes of mental illness.

Much still remains unknown, particularly how the social and cultural worlds interact with neurobiological processes to produce mental symptoms that we recognize as depression or psychosis in everyday life and what this interaction implies for diagnosis and treatment."

FPR-UCLA 4th Interdisciplinary Conference Cultural and Biological Contexts of Psychiatric Disorder: Implications for Diagnosis and Treatment.
L.A., USA, January 22-24, 2010. ***www.conference1@thefpr.org***

II. Geschichte und Gegenwart der Nervenheilkunde

‚Diseases of the mind‘	*(Hippocrates)*
‚Science and Humanism‘	*(E Schrödinger)*
‚The equation of mind with brain‘	*(FMR Walshe)*
‚Brain and conscious experience‘	*(J Eccles)*
‚Philosophical dimensions of the neuro-medical sciences‘	*(HT Engelhard Jr)*
‚Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität‘	*(H Jonas)*
‚Brain-behavior relationships ‘	*(M Trimble)*

‚The sacred disease‘, (i. e. epilepsy), und ‚other diseases of the mind‘
„has a natural cause from which it originates like other affections“
– „and men ought to know that from nothing else but thence
(from the brain) comes joys, delights, laughter, and sports,
and sorrows, griefs, despondency and lamentations . ...
And by the same organ we become mad and delirious,
and fears and terrors assail us ...“.

Adams T (1939) The genuine works of Hippocrates, 355, 366.

Zit. n. Trimble MR (1996) Biological psychiatry. 2nd ed, 1.

„I consider science an integrating part of our endeavour to answer the one great philosophical question which embraces all others, the one that Plotinus expressed by his brief: ‚tines de haemeis?‘ – who are we? And more than that: I consider this not only one of the tasks, but* the *task, of science, the only one hat really counts.“

Schrödinger E (1951) Science and Humanism.

Zit. n. Eccles JC (ed) (1966) Brain and conscious experience.
Study week September 28 to October 4, 1964,
of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, xv.

„There is a sense in which the present is an age of which a characteristic is its failure to understand the status of its own abstractions, and this ... is the inevitable fruit of the divorce of natural science from metaphysics, to have achieved which was the empty triumph of the nineteenth century.“

Walshe FMR (1953) Thoughts upon the equation of mind with brain.

Brain 76:1-18, 16. In: Eccles JC (ed) (1966) Brain and conscious experience, vii.

„ ... For example, to me (Eccles) all sciences have a philosophical basis and it is generally agreed that there is a philosophy of science which is in fact basic to all scientific investigations and discussions.“

Eccles JC (ed) (1966) Brain and conscious experience. Study week September 28 to October 4, 1964, of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, vii.

„ ... and scientists, particularly physicists and what we may call neuroscientists, have continued to struggle with this most baffling of all scientific problems confronting man, namely the subject of this Study Week – Brain and Conscious Experience.“

Eccles JC (ed) (1966) Brain and conscious experience, xv.

„The aim of the Second Symposium was to examine some of the central philosophical issues raised by the neuro-medical sciences, ...

Unlike the Study Week at the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, the Second Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine was not designed to explore in detail the mechanisms of neural activity. Instead, the emphasis was to be made in another direction: understanding the significance of neural activity.“

Spicker SF, Engelhardt Jr HT (eds) (1976) Philosophical dimensions of the neuro-medical sciences. Proceedings of the second trans-disciplinary symposium on philosophy and medicine held at Farmington, Connecticut, May 15-17, 1975. Philosophy and Medicine 2, Introduction, 1f.

„The modern neuro-medical sciences developed out of centuries of investigation and debate concerning the function of the nervous system. The problematic of the neuro-medical sciences has not simply involved determining facts concerning neural function but has involved finding a language appropriate to the description of such functions.

The availability of both a physical and psychological language for description of neural functioning insured that the mind-body problem would be a recurring issue in the interpretation of findings concerning the nervous system.“

Spicker, Engelhardt (eds) (1976), Introduction, 2.

„As it became apparent that the nervous system is not simply another organ system of the body, but is* in some sense *the embodiment of mind, neurophysiology was caught up with the question of how the ways we talk about mind should bear on how we talk about the nervous system.“

Spicker, Engelhardt (eds) (1976), Introduction, 2.

„In some sense, ***one experiences and lives in and through one's nervous system, especially the neocortex of the brain, so that such experience can be said to be a function of the nervous system. The problem has been to specify the*** **sense** ***in which the nervous system embodies mind or the*** **sense** ***in which ones lives and experiences in and through one's nervous system, or the*** **sense** ***in which mental life can be said to be a function of the nervous system, in addition to specifying the meaning of talk about mental states, such as states of pain.“***

Spicker, Engelhardt (eds) (1976), Introduction, 2f.

Hans Jonas verweist auf die Schüler von Johannes P. Müller (1801-1858), Brücke (1819–1892) und du Bois-Reymond (1818–1896) und später Helmholtz (1821-1894), die sich im 19. Jh. ab 1845 gegen eine idealistische und romantische Naturwissenschaft wandten und sich verschworen:

„die Wahrheit geltend zu machen, daß im Organismus keine anderen Kräfte wirksam sind als die gemein physikalisch-chemischen“.

Zit. n. Jonas H (1987) Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität. Das Leib-Seele-Problem im Vorfeld des Prinzips Verantwortung, 13.

Cf. Jonas H (1976) On the power or impotence of subjectivity. In: Spicker SF, Engelhardt Jr HT (eds) (1975) Philosophical dimensions of the neuro-medical sciences. Proceedings of the second trans-disciplinary symposium on philosophy and medicine held at Farmington, Connecticut, May 15-17, 1975. Philosophy and Medicine 2, 143-162.

„The middle to late 19th century was a crucial era in the history of the neurosciences with regards to the relationship between neurology and psychiatry. The continuing pursuit of localization, and anatomic-pathological correlations based on these ideas, crystalized the discipline of neurology and led to distinctions with psychiatry. One reason for their separation was that localization failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for mental disorders. Another was that alienists, the physician superintendants of asylums who dealt with much severe psychiatric illness, remained aloof from the general stream of medicine.

There were two outstanding figures of this era of relevance to the theme ..., one a neurologist, the other a psychiatrist. ... The first was Hughlings Jackson, the second Henry Maudsley.“

Trimble MR (1989) The relationship between psychiatry and neurology. A british perspective with particular reference to neuropsychiatry.

In: Mueller J (ed) (1989) Neurology and psychiatry: A meeting of minds. 14-30, 17f.

„Thus, biological psychiatry is a complicated subject, requiring in particular an intimate knowledge of the central nervous system.“

„Such progress is often ignored when discussing psychiatry, and emphasis is often given to an alternative stream of thought, one of psychological theorizing, which arose on the neo-romantic tide of the turn of the century. This culminated in the psychoanalytic movement, which for a considerable time became synonymous with psychiatry. The point is made, however, that this era has provided psychiatry with a legacy that it does not deserve, the main trend of the tradition for over 2000 years being medical and neuropathologically based.“

Trimble MR (1996) Biological psychiatry. 2nd ed, ix-x.

„The distractions of psychoanalysis for present-day psychiatry cannot be overemphasized. To base theories today of aetiology, pathogenesis and treatment on ideas that were dominant nearly 100 years ago makes little sense in view of the increase in knowledge that has accrued since that time.“

„As the history of the discipline shows, however, psychiatry is, and has always been, concerned with behavior in its widest sense, and had continually searched for knowledge of brain-behavior relationships and the somatic underpinnings of psychopathology.“

Trimble MR (1996) Biological psychiatry. 2nd ed, 18, 19.

„Indeed, our concepts of the brain, its function, its structure, and its relationship to many clinical phenomena have changed so radically in the past 25 years that the development of areas so long in the borderland or ... wilderness between neurology and psychiatry, is only to be expected.

Such has been the division, that new disciplines have grown up which themselves try to cross the bridges and are variously termed neuropsychiatry, organic psychiatry, biological psychiatry, and behavioral neurology.“

Trimble (1989) The relationship between psychiatry and neurology.
A british perspective with particular reference to neuropsychiatry.

In: Mueller J (ed) (1989) Neurology and psychiatry: A meeting of minds. 14-30, 28.

„Indeed, there appear to be four major differences between the much older neuropsychiatry and the newer discipline of behavioral neurology. Neuropsychiatry has a tradition as firmly rooted in brain function and pathology as does behavioral neurology, but has in addition:

(1) a greater reference to changes of function as opposed to structure;
(2) a tendency to embrace holism rather than localizationist approaches as a preferred method of understanding brain-behavior relationships;
(3) an interest in a wider spectrum of disorders, and
(4) an understanding of the dynamics of human behavior.“

Trimble (1989) The relationship between psychiatry and neurology.
A british perspective with particular reference to neuropsychiatry.

In: Mueller J (ed) (1989) Neurology and psychiatry: A meeting of minds. 14-30, 28f.

III. Das Psychophysische Problem im 19. / 20. Jh.

‚Brain and conscious experience‘	*(J Eccles)*
‚Körper und Geist‘	*(GT Fechner)*
‚Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis‘	*(E Du Bois- Reymond)*
‚The mind-body relation’	*(HT Engelhardt Jr)*
‚The gap’ - ‚hard problem’	*(B Libet)*
‚Syneidesis‘ – ‚Selbstverhältnisse‘	*(D Henrich)*

„I agree with the philosophers at the symposium that conscious experiences are not reducible to physics, and that we do not yet have any satisfactory approach to the brain-mind problem.

This problem seems to become ever more intractable the more we advance in the scientific study of the brain."

Eccles JC (ed) (1966) Brain and conscious experience.
Study week September 28 to October 4, 1964,
of the Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, vii.

„Ob wir die geistigen Vorgänge aus materiellen Bedingungen je begreifen werden ist eine Frage, ganz verschieden von der, ob diese Vorgänge das Erzeugnis materieller Bedingungen sind.

Jene Frage kann verneint werden, ohne dass über diese Frage etwas ausgemacht, geschweige denn sie verneint würde“.

Du Bois-Reymond E (1872) Über die Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis.

In: Du Bois-Reymond E (Hrsg) Vorträge über Philosophie und Gesellschaft.

„Körper und Geist oder Leib und Seele oder Materielles und Ideelles oder Physisches und Psychisches, ... sind nicht im letzten Grund und Wesen, sondern nur nach dem Standpunkt der Auffassung oder Betrachtung verschieden.

Was sich selbst auf innerem Standpunkt als geistig, psychisch erscheint, vermag einem Gegenüberstehenden, vermöge dessen dagegen äußeren Standpunct nur in anderer Form, welche eben die des leiblichen materiellen Ausdrucks ist, zu erscheinen.“

Fechner GT (1851) ZEND-AVESTA
oder über die Dinge des Himmels und des Jenseits. Bd. II, 321.

„The mind–body problem becomes significant for the empirical scientist when it is recognized as a symptom of a failure to clarify the broad conceptual paradigm in terms of which the sciences of psychology and neurophysiology are to be integrated.

The difficulty is one of distinguishing different areas of empirical research requiring different methods as well as a way of coordinating their results. One must determine rules according to which disparate domains of reality are to be thought of in conjunction.

Different rules, naturally, will have different consequences. One will approach neurological and psychological events differently depending on wether one takes them to be really distinct or reducible one to the other.“

Engelhardt Jr HT (1975) John Hughlings Jackson and the mind-body relation. Bulletin of the History of Medicine 49:137-151, 138.

„This investigation will view the relation of mind and body no longer as the association of two substances, two things, but as the integration of two levels of conceptual richness. ... It recognizes that philosophy seeks no new facts about being but rather a way of understanding the integration of widely diverse domains of facts.“

Engelhardt Jr HT (1973) Mind-Body: A categorial relation. viii.

„The recognition of new facts requires the development of new concepts and ways of relating concepts. ... When these facts concern broad conceptual issues, then the scientist is involved in questions of ontology. That is, he must presuppose something about the general categories of reality. The scientist thus becomes involved in molding new patterns of thought.“

Engelhardt Jr HT (1975) John Hughlings Jackson and the mind-body relation. Bulletin of the History of Medicine 49:137-151, 138f.

„But many scientists and philosophers appear not to realize that their rigid view that determinism is valid is still based on **faith.** *They really don't have the answer. ...*

The more meaningfull question, therefore, would be: Does the phenomenon of conscious experience, and its relation to the physical brain, fully obey the known rules and laws of the physical world?“

Libet B (2004) Mind Time. The temporal factor in consciousness, 6.

„I shall state ... that this determinist materialist view is a belief system; it is not a scientific theory that has been verified by direct tests.

It is true that scientific discoveries have increasingly produced powerfull evidence for the ways in which mental abilities, and even the nature of one's personality, are dependent on, and can be controlled by, specific structures and functions of the brain.

However, the nonphysical nature of subjective awareness, including the feelings of spirituality, creativity, conscious will, and imagination, is not describable or explainable directly by the physical evidence alone."

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 5.

„As a neuroscientist investigating these issues for more than thirty years, I can say that these subjective phenomena are not predictable by knowledge of neuronal function. This is in contrast to my earlier views as a young scientist, when I believed in the validity of determinist materialism. That was before I began my research on brain processes in conscious experience, at age 40.

There is no guarantee that the phenomenon of awareness and its concomitants will be explainable in terms of presently known physics.“

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 5.

„In fact, conscious mental phenomena are not reducible to or explicable by knowledge of nerve cell activities. You should look into the brain and see nerve cell interconnections and neural messages popping about in immense profusion. But you would not observe any conscious mental subjective phenomena. Only a report by the individual who is experiencing such phenomena could tell you about them.“

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 5.

„All of these feelings and awarenesses are part of your subjective inner life. They are subjective in the sense that they are accessible* only *to the individual subject who is experiencing them. They are* not *evident in and cannot be described by observations of the physical brain.

Our subjective inner life is what really matters to us as human beings. Yet we know and understand little of how it arises and how it functions in our conscious will to act. We do know that the physical brain is essential to and intimately involved in the manifestation of our conscious, subjective experiences.“

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 1f.

„I set out two epistemological principles that I believe must be followed:
the introspective report as the operational criterion
and no a priori rules for mind-brain relationship“.

„The general principle to be followed, in contrast to behaviorism,
is that externally observable ‚physical‘ events and the inner observable
‚mental‘ events are phenomenologically independent categories.
The two are certainly* interrelated, *but the relationship between
them can be discovered only by simultaneous observations of the two
***separate phenomena. The relationship cannot be predicted* a priori.**
Neither phenomenon is reducible to or describable by the other.“

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 16f.

„This principle leads to a flat rejection of the reductionist view popular with many scientists and philosophers ... . According to this view, knowledge of the neuronal structures and functions (or their molecular underpinnings) is sufficient for defining and explaining consciousness and mental activities.“

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 18.

„How can the **physical activities** ***of nerve cells in the brain give rise to*** **the nonphysical subjective experiences,** ***which include sensory awareness of the external world, thoughts, feelings of beauty, inspiration, spirituality, soulfulness, and so on?***
How can the gap between the „physical“ (the brain) and the „mental“ (our conscious, subjective experiences) be bridged ?”

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 2f.

„The foundation of our own experimental studies in the physiology of conscious experience (beginning in the late 1950s) was that externally observable brain processes and the related reportable subjective introspective experiences must be studied simultaneously, as independent categories, to understand their relationship. The assumption that a deterministic nature of the physically observable world can account for subjective conscious functions and events is a speculative* belief *, not a scientifically proven proposition."

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 153.

„There is an unexplained gap between the category of physical phenomena, and the category of subjective phenomena. Researchers as far back Leibniz have pointed out that if you looked into the brain with full knowledge of its physical makeup and nerve cell activities, you would see nothing that described subjective experience. You would only see cellular structures, their interconnections, and the production of nerve impulses and other electrophysiological events, as well as metabolic chemical changes."

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 153.

„Perhaps the most profound question we can ask is,
How can conscious subjective experience arise from
activities of nerve cells in the brain?
That is, how can the mental arise from the physical?
There is no doubt that appropriate neural activities
in the human brain are essential for the mental
(subjective experience) to appear. ...

Conscious subjective experience is accessible
only to the individual having the experience.
Yet it appears only in relation to appropriate
neural activities in the brain. ...
We have seen that the relationship between
conscious experience and neuronal activities
in the brain can be studied successfully
by examining the two features together,
as independent but interrelated variables. ... “

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 157f.

„However, even a successful investigation of the correlative relationship between conscious experience and neuronal activities ... will not answer a more profound problem:

How does the categorically different nonphysical phenomenon of subjective experience come from the physical activities of nerve cells ?
This problem has been termed the ‚hard problem' by the philosopher David Chalmers (1996)”.

Libet B (2004) Mind time, 158.

Chalmers DJ (1996) The conscious mind.

„So kommt auch ein Zwang ... zur Wirkung, wenn in einem der wichtigsten Dokumente der oikeiosis-Lehre die Vertrautheit eines Wesens mit sich auch noch das zum Inhalt hat, kraft dessen Vertrautheit überhaupt bestehen kann - sein Wissen von sich (syneidesis).

Selbstgefühl kann ich nur haben, wenn ich zugleich davon weiß, d a ß ich mit mir vertraut bin: ... kai ten tautes syneidesin.“

Diogenes Laertius VII, 85.

Zit. n. Henrich D (1975) Über Selbstbewußtsein und Selbsterhaltung.
In: Selbstverhältnisse 1982, 114.

„Ein jegliches ist Geist schon in ihm selbst, bevor es sich zu anderen in Beziehung bringt. ... Ihr voraus geht die Zuwendung, mit der jegliches entdeckt, von welcher Art es überhaupt ist, eine Zuwendung, die man ein ursprüngliches Gewahren seiner (syneidesis) nennen muß. In ihr erfährt ein Wesen, daß es wirklich ist und bestimmten Wesens und gründet ein Verhältnis zu sich.“

Henrich D (1970) Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie.
In: Selbstverhältnisse 1982, 92.

„Kenntnis haben von sich, vertraut sein mit sich – das ist eine Struktur, die nicht von den Merkmalen der Art dependiert, der ein Wesen angehört. Jedes Wesen, gleich welcher Art, sofern es nur mit sich vertraut ist, ist durch diese Selbstbeziehung jedem anderen gleich.

Das Gewahren des eigenen Wesens, rein als dieses Gewahren genommen, und als Vorbedingung der Selbsterhaltung, könnte die gleiche Allgemeinheit haben, die dem Sein selber in der Ontologie des Aristoteles zukam.“

Henrich D (1970) Die Grundstruktur der modernen Philosophie.
In: Selbstverhältnisse 1982, 92f.

„Von einem Subjekt ist dann zu sprechen, wenn eine Aktivität im Wissen von sich fundiert ist und wenn ein Prozeß von diesem Wissen her eingeleitet und unterhalten wird. Insofern also die beiden Prozesse solche sind, in die das Subjekt eintritt und als solches sich ausbildet, und insofern weitere Aktivitäten von ihnen her modifiziert werden, ist es möglich, von S u b j e k t i v i t ä t in einem prozessualen Sinn zu sprechen.“

So *„wird es möglich und sinnvoll, den Prozeß, in dem das Subjekt begriffen ist, als ein Leben zu verstehen, für das es gilt, daß es im Bewußtsein des Subjektes von sich und aus ihm heraus zu vollziehen ist. Beides ist zusammengenommen, wenn dem Menschen ein b e w u ß t e s L e b e n zugesprochen wird.“*

Henrich D (1999) Bewußtes Leben, 19f.

„Wenn nun aber Subjektivität und Selbsterhaltung in einem direkten Zusammenhang miteinander stehen, so folgt, daß immer auch ein Gedanke von einem Ganzen im Spiel ist, in dem Bewußtsein und mit ihm Rationalität aufkommen, fungieren und sich entfalten ...

Dieser weitere Zusammenhang ist, vom Standpunkt der Subjektivität oder des bewußten Lebens selbst aus gesehen, schon anderes als ein empirischer oder ein szientifischer Weltbegriff, und insofern eine Metaphysik.“

Interview Henrich D (1991) Philosophie im einen Deutschland.
In: Nach dem Ende der Teilung 1993, 186f.

„Wer nicht versucht ist Materialist zu sein, erfährt wohl gar nicht die Dringlichkeit, zu einer Weltbeschreibung zu kommen, die sich der materialistischen Reduktion von Subjektivität und Intentionalität nicht unterwirft ... . Wir sind also in der Situation, eine alternative Weltbeschreibung wenn nicht entwickeln und beweisen, so doch skizzieren oder zumindest mit Gründen offenhalten zu müssen, innerhalb deren das bewußte Leben zu letzten Gedanken über sich selbst kommen kann – eine Weltbeschreibung, in der wir dann auch als Subjekt und Person vorkommen können.“

Interview Henrich D (1995) Bewußtes Leben und Metaphysik.
In: Bewußtes Leben 1999, 208f.

„Wenn sich auch die Intention, zu einer Verständigung über Subjektivität zu gelangen, mit dem Projekt der physikalischen Theorie verbinden kann, so ist doch die diesem Unternehmen eigene Verfassung selbst nicht von einem solchen Motiv her bestimmt oder mitbestimmt. Das Motiv, Subjektivität zu begreifen, schließt sich an diese (physikalische) Theorie an, ohne daß diese Theorie ihrerseits einen für sie wesentlichen Anschluß an eben dieses Motiv hätte.“

Henrich D (1999) Bewußtes Leben, 30f.

„ ... Das Denken, das im bewußten Leben als solchem am Werke ist, unterliegt nicht den Kriterien, die für den Erwerb von Erkenntnis aus Forschungsgängen oder in ausgearbeiteten Systemen verbindlich sind.“

Henrich D (1999) Bewußtes Leben, 33.

„Philosophische Grundbegriffe, von denen her sich ganze Weltbegriffe ausbilden können, haben immer Implikationen, die nicht nur die Theorie, sondern Weisen der gelebten Weltbeziehung betreffen. ... Man kann daraus die Ermäßigung aller Erkenntnisansprüche herleiten. Es folgt aber in Wahrheit zugleich auch die Möglichkeit zur Rechtfertigung einer Rationalität, die nicht in Beweisprogrammen aufgeht. Was in dem, was ehemals ‚Metaphysik' bezeichnete, durchaus nicht hinfällig geworden ist, hat in dieser Rationalität seine Begründung."

Interview Henrich D (1991) Philosophie im einen Deutschland.
In: Nach dem Ende der Teilung 1993, 186f.

„Nach all den Debatten ...kann man wohl festhalten, daß die physikalische Theorie als der einzige Kandidat für eine letzte wissenschaftliche Weltbeschreibung keine Möglichkeit dazu eröffnet, einen Weltbegriff auszubilden, in dem Subjekt und Subjektivität so, wie sie hier erklärt worden sind, einen Platz finden könnten.“ ...

Es „stimmt damit zusammen, daß die physikalische Weltbeschreibung auf Verfahren beruht, die darauf ausgehen, die ontologische Vielfalt von all dem zu beseitigen, was uns in der Welt begegnet, in die wir hineinwachsen. Erst damit entsteht eine einheitliche Beschreibungsart, ohne die allgemeingültige Erklärungen nicht zu gewinnen sind.“

Henrich D (1999) Bewußtes Leben, 29f.

„Der im Hinblick auf Lebensdeutung wichtigste Sachverhalt ist aber, daß die Theorie der Materie, sofern sie wissenschaftliche Theorie ist, Grundform und Dynamik des bewußten Lebens auf gar keine Weise in sich begreifen kann. Man kann die materielle Natur von Bewusstsein für überwältigend evident halten. Seit der Entwicklung der Neurologie und ihrer Popularisierung ist dies zu einer sogar populären Evidenz geworden. Aber die physikalische Theorie erlaubt es nicht anzugeben, **in welchem Sinne** *die Prozesse des Bewußtseins materielle Prozesse sind. Sie sind keine möglichen Gegenstände der Physiologie und also der Physik des Großhirns.*

Der Materialismus ist also zwangsläufig eine theoretische Extrapolation ... So muß man hinsichtlich des Materialismus einen begrenzten Satz (ein limitatives Theorem) von der Art formulieren, die für die moderne Mathematik so bedeutsam geworden ist: Ist der Materialismus wahr, so ist er in Beziehung auf Bewußtsein nur unwiderstehlich, nicht aber beweisbar.“

Henrich D (1981) Lebensdeutungen der Zukunft. In: Fluchtlinien 1982, 33.

IV. Psychiatrie – eine ‚Brückendisziplin der Modalitäten‘

‚Neuropsychiatry and behavioral neurology’
(JL Cummings / M Trimble)

‚Body schema and intentionality’ *(S Gallagher)*

‚Naturalistisches Dilemma‘ *(M Pauen)*

‚A universe of consciousness’ *(GM Edelman)*

New kind of ‚qualitative science’ *(P Fenwick)*

‚Formen des Wissens‘ *(W Wieland)*

„Neuropsychiatry and behavioral neurology are evolving disciplines devoted to understanding the behavioral consequences of brain dysfunction and using this information to improve patient care.

Neuropsychiatry emphasizes psychiatric disorders associated with brain dysfunction such as poststroke depression and epilepsy-related psychosis, whereas behavioral neurology addresses deficit syndromes such as aphasia, amnesia, and agnosia. Both these approaches are critical to fully assessing and managing patients with brain disorders.“

Cummings JL, Trimble MR (1995) Concise guide to neuropsychiatry and behavioral neurology. xxi.

„The explicit and nearly universal rejection of Cartesian dualism in the cognitive sciences is for good reasons. Strategies for avoiding mind-body dualism include reducing mental events to brain processes and replacing intentional explanations with neurophysiological accounts. Quite often these approaches also involve reducing the **body** *to the brain. In some cases one type of reductionism, mind to brain, assumes another type, body to brain. In the neurosciences ... it is difficult to find any acknowledgment or explanation of the role played by the body as a whole in the cognitive operations of the brain. The body is reduced to its representation in the somatosensory cortex or is considered important only to the extent that it provides the raw sensory input required for cognitive computations. In other cases, the body is first reduced to the mind, which in turn is reduced to the brain. This approach is more apparent in psychology. The body is first treated as an intentional object, an image, a mental representation, and then reduced to neural computations. Functionalism ... is a major strategy that refuses to attribute an essential role in cognition to the human body.“*

Gallagher S (1995) Body schema and intentionality.

In: Bermudez JL, Marcel A, Eilan N (eds) (1995) The body and the self, 225-244, 225.

„Diese präreflexive Selbstvertrautheit ist nicht ganz einfach zu explizieren, an eine wissenschaftliche Beschreibung ihrer natürlichen Grundlagen ist jedenfalls in den Augen der Vertreter der Heidelberger Schule nicht zu denken. Daher entsteht auch hier ein Konflikt zwischen naturalistischem Forschungsprogramm und Selbstbewußtsein, doch die Schlußfolgerung ist ... genau entgegengesetzt:
Die Vertreter der Heidelberger Schule geben also nicht die Realität des Ich auf, sondern ziehen dem naturalistischen Programm Grenzen. Wollen wir an der Realität des präreflexiven Selbstbewußtseins festhalten, dann müssen wir einfach akzeptieren, daß unsere Erklärungen hier eine prinzipielle Grenze haben.

Beide Positionen (d.i. Dennett vs. Henrich) liefern ein besonderes Beispiel für das naturalistische Dilemma, also die Vorstellung, daß wir entweder zentrale Bestandteile unseres Selbstverständnisses aufgeben müssen, um an dem naturalistischen Forschungsprogramm festhalten zu können, oder aber gezwungen sind, dem naturalistischen Forschungsprogramm klare Grenzen zu setzen, um vor einer fundamentalen Revision unseres Selbstverständnisses geschützt zu sein.“

Pauen M (2006) Was ist der Mensch? Die Entdeckung der Natur des Geistes, 140f.

„An adequate theory of consciousness must contain an explanation of the properties of conscious experience. It should account both for intentionality and for the discriminability of qualia or phenomenal experiences.“

Edelman GM (1989) The remembered present.
A biological theory of consciousness, xviii.

„We have argued throughout this book that consciousness arises from certain arrangements in the material order of the brain.
... What is the difference? It is that conscious thought is a set of relations with a meaning that goes beyond just energy or matter (although it involves both). And what of the mind that gave rise to that thought? The answer is, it is both material and meaningful.“

Edelman GM, Tononi G (2000) A universe of consciousness.
How matter becomes imagination, 219.

„Modern sciences has no place for the study of our subjective experience, yet science relies on perceptions of the world. To resolve the paradox and understand consciousness, we need to establish a new kind of ‚qualitative science'. One difficulty has long beset neurophysiology and psychology: there appears to be no place in the brain for conscious or mind. This conundrum has led many scientists to conclude that mind does not exist as a separate entity. Psychology and psychiatry suffer from this exclusion: they lack a theoretical framework in which to explain and investigate consciousness."

... „These two views, one through the primary qualities (physics) and the other through the secondary qualities (subjective experience) might then be related to make a unified whole. Brains could then become conscious."

**Fenwick P, Lorimer D (1989) Can brains be conscious?
New Scientist Aug 5, 1989, 54-56, 54, 56.**

„Die Medizin ist von Haus aus eine praktische Disziplin; sie ist weder eine Natur – noch eine Sozialwissenschaft; ihre Intention geht nicht darauf, ein Stück natürlicher oder sozialer Wirklichkeit zu erkennen, sondern darauf, in dieser Wirklichkeit bewußt und geplant zu handeln.“

Wieland W (1975) Diagnose. Überlegungen zur Medizintheorie.

In: Anschütz F (1987) Ärztliches Handeln.
Grundlagen, Möglichkeiten, Grenzen, Widersprüche, 114.

„Praktisch sind sie (die Disziplinen) deswegen, weil ihr Ziel nicht darin besteht, zutreffende Sätze über Handlungen zu gewinnen, sondern darin, Handlungen selbst zu ermöglichen, zu begründen und zu rechtfertigen ... .“

Wieland W (1986) Strukturwandel der Medizin und ärztliche Ethik. Philosophische Überlegungen zu Grundfragen einer praktischen Wissenschaft, 30.

„Dennoch besteht ihr (der praktischen Wissenschaften) eigentliches Ziel immer darin, praktisches Wissen zu verwirklichen und zu vervollkommnen, nicht aber darin, es lediglich zum Gegenstand einer Theorie zu machen.

Praktisches Wissen auf seinen verschiedenen Stufen ist also nichts Irrationales. Es kann ... zum Gegenstand von begründeten Aussagen gemacht werden. Im Gegensatz zum theoretischen (Wissen) wird es aber in solchen Aussagen nicht selbst präsent; es läßt sich mit Hilfe von Aussagen allein einem anderen auch niemals mitteilen. Man kann es immer nur in eigener Person und in eigener Kompetenz erwerben. Dabei kann man zwar Hilfe in Anspruch nehmen, doch es ist nicht möglich, sich vertreten zu lassen.“

Wieland W (1986) Strukturwandel der Medizin und ärztliche Ethik, 34.

Die Philosophie „kann jedoch das Bewußtsein für die Tatsache sensibel machen, daß die durch die modernen Wissenschaften auf eine fast unvorstellbare Weise verfeinerten Methoden, die Wirklichkeit auf propositionale Weise zu erfassen, nur eine von mehreren Möglichkeiten des Zugangs zur Wirklichkeit repräsentieren.

Sie kann zeigen, wie die für das nichtpropositionale Wissen spezifischen Valenzen immer nur durch bestimmte Erfahrungsformen auf originäre Weise gegeben werden können, nicht aber durch darauf bezogene Aussagen ... .

Sie kann schließlich zeigen, in welcher Weise die propositional ausgeformten Erkenntnisse der Wissenschaften selbst erst unter der Voraussetzung von Gestalten nichtpropositionalen Wissens möglich sind.“

Wieland W (1986) Strukturwandel der Medizin und ärztliche Ethik, 12.